Who rewrote Hungary's constitutional order, when, how and with what majority — from the democratic rebirth of the Stalinist 1949 constitution, through the Fundamental Law that Fidesz adopted single-handedly, to TISZA's 2026 amendment.
Hungary's first written constitution was the work not of democracy but of dictatorship. What turned it into a state under the rule of law was not a new document, but a negotiated, consensual rewrite in 1989 — the exact opposite of how the constitution was made in 2011 and 2026.
The preamble of the 1989 constitution deliberately called itself provisional: "until the adoption of our country's new Constitution". The plan was for the final constitution to be drawn up by a freely elected parliament, with broad consensus. That did not happen for 20 years — because the parties deliberately tied it to a high, four-fifths threshold, so that no single force could rewrite it alone.
Between 1990 and 2010 the constitution was amended many times — close to thirty, by András Körösényi's count — but typically by a two-thirds majority, often with explicit cross-party consensus. The 1990 MDF–SZDSZ pact was an agreement between the largest governing party and the largest opposition force. And in 1994–98 the MSZP–SZDSZ coalition, though it held a two-thirds majority, voluntarily bound its own hands: with Act XLIV of 1995 it tied the rules of constitution-making to a four-fifths majority, so it could never be one-sided.
It was Fidesz–KDNP that abolished this four-fifths guarantee in July 2010, immediately after taking power — using its two-thirds majority to strike down a rule that had originally been adopted by four-fifths. Several constitutional lawyers regard this as the moment when constitution-making ceased to be a shared endeavour and became the tool of a single camp.
Fidesz did not "amend the old constitution by x percent". It replaced it entirely with a brand-new Fundamental Law, adopted without a referendum, amid an opposition walkout, using only its own votes.
Fidesz did not amend partially: it carried out a 100% replacement. It threw away the old constitution — made democratic in 1989 — and created an entirely new document, and did so in a way that, unlike the practice of 1989–2010, not a single opposition vote supported, and it never asked the people in a referendum.
Four charts on what the press conferences leave unsaid: how the electoral system manufactured a two-thirds majority, how often Fidesz reached for its own Fundamental Law, and how many times international courts declared its moves unlawful.
Fidesz rewrote the Fundamental Law it had billed as "everlasting" 15 times in 13 years — often to force through some specific group or decision, frequently by bypassing the Constitutional Court itself. Click for details.
After the Constitutional Court struck down the disguised, substantive provisions of the "Transitional Provisions", Fidesz simply raised the contested subjects to constitutional level — where the Court could no longer review them on the merits. This is how it reinstated the criminalisation of homelessness, the parliamentary "recognition" of churches, the restriction of paid political advertising and a narrowed definition of family.
At the same time it repealed the entire pre-2012 case law of the Constitutional Court, and declared that the Court may review constitutional amendments only on procedural, not substantive, grounds. According to the Venice Commission this is "an instrumental view of the constitution" that "seriously undermines constitutional review".
It introduced the protection of "constitutional identity" and of "Christian culture", a ban on the "settlement of an alien population", and completely prohibited homeless people from living in public spaces — sanctioned with detention. A political message raised to constitutional rank.
It wrote a restriction of gender identity into the Fundamental Law, along with the framework for the "public-interest asset management foundation" (KEKVA) system, through which public wealth was moved out of state control and into the hands of pro-government boards of trustees.
It excluded presidential clemency for crimes committed against children — a direct reaction to the clemency scandal that led to Katalin Novák's resignation. Classic event-driven, ad hoc constitution-making.
It declared that "sex at birth is a biological fact", and that a child's right to protection takes precedence over every other fundamental right — thereby creating a constitutional basis for restricting Pride. Freedom of assembly was subordinated to a broadly interpreted clause.
These 15 amendments show clearly that in Fidesz's hands the constitution was not a constraint but a tool: whenever the Constitutional Court or a scandal stood in the way, they simply rewrote the highest-ranking law. This is precisely the "abuse of the two-thirds majority" now being pinned on TISZA.
Over 16 years Fidesz did not merely rewrite rules; it removed constitutional office-holders and tailored institutions to its own measure. These moves are the historical yardstick for today's TISZA steps — and often the proof of a double standard.
Fidesz expanded the bench from 11 to 15 and abolished the parity-based nominating committee — so it could nominate alone, without opposition agreement. It raised the term from 9 to 12 years. The Court was gradually filled with pro-government nominees. In addition, Article 37(4) of the Fundamental Law, after the annulment of the 98% special tax, removed budgetary and tax matters from the Court's jurisdiction.
Fidesz cut the judicial retirement age to 62 in one stroke, forcing about 274 judges and prosecutors into retirement — including many court leaders, whose posts could then be filled with new appointees. Both the Hungarian Constitutional Court (33/2012) and the European Court of Justice declared it unlawful (C-286/12) — for age discrimination.
By turning the Supreme Court into the "Kúria", the mandate of its president András Baka ended prematurely, and a tailor-made condition (5 years of domestic judicial practice) barred his re-election. The real reason: he had publicly criticised Fidesz's judicial reforms. The European Court of Human Rights condemned Hungary in 2016 (Baka v. Hungary, 15:2, €70,000 in damages).
This is the direct precursor of today's "Lex Sulyok" — back then Fidesz did exactly what it now accuses TISZA of: removing a constitutional office-holder by reorganisation, with a tailor-made rule.
In 2019 Fidesz changed the rule so that service as a constitutional judge could substitute for judicial practice — enabling András Zs. Varga, who had never spent a single day as a judge, to become Kúria president. The National Judicial Council opposed it 13:1. At this very press conference Gulyás admitted the law had been changed "years earlier" precisely to allow this.
Media Council (2010): five members, all pro-government nominees, with 9-year terms starting simultaneously. Data-protection commissioner: András Jóri's office was terminated early and merged into the NAIH — the European Court of Justice condemned it (C-288/12). Prosecution: Péter Polt's term was raised from 6 to 9 years and made irremovable without a two-thirds majority; corruption investigations close to the government were repeatedly dropped (e.g. Elios).
Lex CEU (2017): a higher-education law tailored against the Soros university — the European Court of Justice ruled it unlawful (C-66/18), and the CEU moved to Vienna. Lex NGO (2017): the stigmatisation of "foreign-funded" civil groups — likewise unlawful (C-78/18). The church law (2011): 300+ churches lost their status — the ECtHR condemned it (2014).
So when Bence Rétvári says "nowhere in Europe is there an example of tailor-made legislation", he is ignoring four rulings against his own government.
TISZA won the April 2026 election with a two-thirds majority (141 seats). The 17th Amendment to the Fundamental Law, now going to its final vote, is the most contested step. Here is the real content behind the Fidesz labels — together with the legitimate concerns.
| Element | Fidesz label | The actual content |
|---|---|---|
| The President | "The violent removal of the head of state" (Lex Sulyok) | On the day after the amendment enters into force, the sitting president's mandate ends; parliament elects a new one. Not physical coercion, but an immediate, tailor-made termination of the mandate by constitutional amendment. Legitimate concern: it bypasses the ordinary procedure and the Court. |
| 12-year MP limit | "Half the opposition can't run again" | Max. 3 won elections / 12 years. Not retroactive — it applies from the next cycle and does not exclude sitting MPs. Term limits exist in many democracies. |
| Constitutional Court | "Decapitating the Court" | A 70-year age limit (ending the mandates of Péter Polt and 3 more judges); the term drops from 12 to 9 years; the judges again elect their own president. At the same time it restores the budgetary/tax jurisdiction the Court lost in 2013. |
| National assets, farmland | "Abolishing the protection" | Removed from the two-thirds scope (national assets, farmland, pensions, the central bank, the State Audit Office) — henceforth amendable by simple majority. Precisely the loosening of the "cementing in" the Venice Commission criticised in 2011. Legitimate concern: the asset-protection guarantee may weaken. |
| NVVH | "ÁVH", "super-prosecution" | In fact the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office — asset recovery, not a criminal prosecution service. Legitimate concern: the Helsinki Committee also criticised the weak judicial oversight. |
The TISZA procedure is indeed fast: a 5-day online consultation (23,000 comments, aggregated with AI), an urgent debate, then the final vote. That is thin public involvement. But the 2011 Fidesz procedure was no better: five weeks passed from submission of the draft to adoption, the 920,000-strong consultation was "processed" while the text was already being debated, and the Venice Commission criticised exactly this haste. The charge of haste is true — but from Fidesz's mouth it is a double standard.
The central question: how "brutal" or "revisionist" are TISZA's moves compared with Fidesz's 16 years — and which side stands closer to international law?
| Question | Fidesz, 2010–2025 | TISZA, 2026 | International legal yardstick |
|---|---|---|---|
| Way of constitution-making | Full replacement, no referendum, opposition walked out (262 yes) | For now an amendment; a new constitution promised in the autumn. Has a two-thirds majority | Both lack broad consensus and a referendum |
| Removal of a constitutional office-holder | András Baka (by reorganisation) — ECtHR condemnation 2016 | Sulyok (by constitutional amendment) — under Venice Commission review | Both problematic; Fidesz's already lost in court |
| Age-based "cleansing" of judges / the Court | 70→62, ~274 judges — ECJ unlawful (C-286/12) | 70-year Court age limit, 4 judges; milder, narrower scope | Retroactive removal is risky in both cases |
| Powers of the Constitutional Court | Narrowed them (Art. 37, tax matters excluded) | Restores the power taken away in 2013 | On this point TISZA moves toward the rule of law |
| Two-thirds "cementing in" | Expanded it (2013: farmland, national assets) | Narrows the cardinal-law scope | In 2011 the Venice Commission recommended narrowing it |
| Judicial oversight of a new body | Sovereignty Protection Office (2023) — weak oversight | NVVH — the Helsinki Committee also criticises the weak oversight | Here TISZA too draws legitimate criticism |
| Relationship to the Venice Commission | Repeated criticism (2011, 2013, 2015) — routinely ignored | Sulyok himself requested the review; the government votes without waiting for the opinion | Neither side waits for the body's opinion |
13 July 2026, 1 p.m. The main claims of the Fidesz and KDNP parliamentary group leaders — and how well they hold up against the facts and their own government's past.
Fidesz replaced the constitution entirely in 2011 — without a referendum, using only its own 262 votes, while the MSZP and LMP walked out. Before that, in 2010, it abolished the four-fifths consensus requirement so it could rewrite the constitution alone. It then amended its own Fundamental Law 15 times.
The word "violent" is a distortion: there is no physical coercion, but a termination of the mandate by constitutional amendment. But the concern is legitimate: the tailor-made, immediate removal of a sitting president by bypassing the ordinary procedure is a genuine rule-of-law problem — one criticised by Sulyok, Amnesty and the TASZ.
It is true that the 70-year age limit ends the mandates of Péter Polt and three judges. But this same Fidesz cut the judicial age limit to 62 in 2011, retiring ~274 judges — which the European Court of Justice declared unlawful. Fidesz also expanded the Court from 11 to 15 and filled it. The current step is milder and narrower than their own precedent.
Tailor-made legislation was a hallmark of the Fidesz era: Lex CEU (annulled by ECJ C-66/18), Lex NGO (annulled by ECJ C-78/18), the church law (condemned by the ECtHR in 2014), Lex Baka. The "12-year limit" is moreover not retroactive; it applies from the next cycle.
The charge of haste is true: the TISZA procedure runs with a 5-day online consultation, under urgency — that really is thin involvement. But the 2011 Fidesz procedure was no better: five weeks passed from submission of the draft to adoption, the 920,000-strong consultation was processed while the text was already being debated (with no real incorporation), and the Venice Commission condemned exactly this haste.
Here Gulyás admits it himself: the rule on the Kúria presidency was changed "years earlier" — precisely so that service as a constitutional judge could substitute for judicial practice, enabling the appointment of András Zs. Varga, who had never sat as a judge (the Judicial Council opposed it 13:1). And it was Fidesz that abolished the parity in Court nominations in 2010.
Gulyás openly admits that the president of the Supreme Court was removed by reorganisation, and that the European Court of Human Rights condemned Hungary for it. In doing so he refutes his own argument: Fidesz did indeed remove a constitutional office-holder in a tailor-made way — it just lost the case with final effect. The "the differences outweigh the similarities" phrase is a way of glossing over the obvious parallel.
A credible analysis does not sweep the real risks of TISZA's moves under the rug either. For clarity, the good-faith concerns and the defensible, rule-of-law-oriented elements are set out separately.
The final picture, then, is not symmetrical. Where the TISZA package is open to attack — the haste, the manner of removing the president, the weak judicial oversight — Fidesz is not a credible accuser, because it did the same (or worse), often losing in international court. But where the package clearly moves toward the rule of law — restoring the Court's powers, loosening the "cementing in" — Fidesz stays silent.
"Revisionist"? Yes, in the neutral sense of the word: TISZA is deliberately dismantling Fidesz's constitutional edifice. "Brutal"? Some of its tools (Lex Sulyok) really are sharp and disputable. But "compliant with international law"? On several points more so than Fidesz's 16 years — with seven adverse rulings behind it. The point is not whether TISZA is flawless, but whether Fidesz's outrage stems from a fear for the rule of law, or from the fact that its own tools are now being turned against it.
Primary and official sources, supplemented with reliable independent press. Every claim is traceable.