Since joining the EU in 2004, Hungary has received over €60 billion in support from the European Union. This page documents in three dimensions how fund distribution was distorted under Fidesz-KDNP governance: the procurement dominance of the oligarch circle, the financial bleeding-dry of opposition municipalities, and the EU's rule of law responses.
How the system works – in three dimensions
Hungary is one of the EU's largest net beneficiaries: support from the common budget amounts to approximately 4–5% of GDP annually. This compilation documents three interconnected mechanisms that together outline the political diversion of funds.
The Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB) analyzed 340,000 procurements and found that between 2011 and 2023, 13 Fidesz-linked businessmen and their companies captured approximately 13–21% of EU-funded procurement spending. Overpricing is estimated at 20–40%, amounting to €3.2–5.5 billion in "kleptocratic loss" to EU taxpayers.
After 2019 – when Budapest and several major cities elected opposition leadership – the government dramatically raised the solidarity contribution, withdrew local business tax revenue, and excluded municipalities from development funds. Budapest has been a net contributor to the state budget since 2021, despite generating nearly 40% of the country's GDP. In 2026, 10 opposition city mayors issued a joint reform proposal.
The European Commission has gradually tightened its stance against Hungary since 2018: from OLAF investigations through rule of law conditionality to the freezing of funds. Approximately €30 billion in support for Hungary is tied to various conditions. The Hungarian government still has not joined the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), which would enable direct investigation of EU fund misuse.
Source: European Commission, Representation in Hungary. A significant portion of the 2021–2027 cycle is frozen.
It is important to note that EU fund distribution does not mean total exclusion of opposition cities. Szeged, Pécs, Tatabánya, Salgótarján and other opposition-led municipalities demonstrably received significant EU funding after 2010. The problem is not total exclusion, but the disproportionality, the distortion of the procurement system, and the resource-withdrawal policy that systematically disadvantages non-governing-party municipalities.
13 NER Key Players and Their Companies – Masters of Public Procurement
Based on CRCB analyses, between 2011–2023, company networks of 13 clearly Fidesz-linked major entrepreneurs captured a disproportionately large share of EU-funded procurements – mostly without competition. These businessmen's share of EU funds increased tenfold after Orbán came to power (2005–2011: €451 million; 2011–2023: multiples of that).
Source: CRCB analyses (2022, 2025). The «crony companies» list includes firms of: Mészáros, Tiborcz, Garancsi, Szijj, Balásy, Simicska, Kuna, Paár, etc.
| Nev | Main sector | Key companies/cases | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meszaros Lorinc | Construction, energy, agriculture | Mészáros és Mészáros Kft., Opus Global | In 2011 still a gas fitter in Felcsút; by 2018 Hungary's richest man |
| Tiborcz Istvan | Real estate, energy | Elios Zrt. (formerly), BDPST Group | Orbán's son-in-law; OLAF recommended €40M clawback in the Elios case |
| Szijj Laszlo | Construction, transport | Duna Aszfalt, Szijj-csoport | Road and bridge construction contracts, road renovations |
| Garancsi Istvan | Construction, sports | Market Zrt. | Stadium construction, real estate development |
| Balasy Gyula | Advertising, communications | New Land Media, Lounge Design | NKH tenders; HUF 650 Bn in procurements since 2012 (CRCB) |
| Simicska Lajos | Construction, media | Közgép (formerly) | Key player until 2015; fell out after the Orbán–Simicska split |
| Kuna Tibor | Advertising, outdoor | ESMA Kft. | Domination of outdoor advertising market |
| Paar Attila | Construction | West Hungaria Bau | Western Hungary construction projects |
| Homlok Zsolt | IT | 4iG (formerly) | IT procurements |
| Csetenyi Csaba | Construction | Grabarics Epitoipari Kft. | Municipal contracts |
| Varga Karoly | Construction | V-Hid Zrt. | Bridge construction projects |
| Hamar Endre | Energy | Energiaszolgaltatas | Energy projects |
| Paar Andras | Construction | Epitoipari cegek | Also featured in the CRCB 2025 analysis |
Key figure: between 2011 and 2021, these 12 individuals' 42 companies won 21% of all money available through EU-funded procurements. About 3,300 companies won 80% of all EU tenders – the disproportion is striking.
Source: Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB), 2022 March · 444.hu reviewAfter the OLAF Elios investigation, competition indicators improved in EU-funded procurements – but worsened in domestically funded tenders. The CRCB calls this the «leakage» phenomenon: where the EU watches, numbers improve; where it doesn't see, the situation deteriorates. By 2025, over half of EU-funded tenders involving NER-linked companies again had no competition.
2020 – the pandemic year: While a significant portion of the country's economic actors struggled with unprecedented difficulties, state and EU money poured into "crony" companies at unprecedented levels. That year, nearly a third of all state procurements went to them.
Withdrawal of funds from Budapest and opposition cities
After the 2019 municipal elections – when Budapest, Szeged, Pécs, Miskolc, Eger, Szombathely, Dunaújváros and other cities elected opposition leadership – the government systematically squeezed municipalities' financial room for maneuver. Its main tools: drastic increase of the solidarity contribution, partial withdrawal of local business tax, and discriminatory exclusion from development funds.
Source: Budapest Municipality, Budapest Citizens' Assembly documents, Index.hu. Tarlós István (Fidesz) as mayor: 2010–2019; Karácsony Gergely (opposition): 2019–.
G7.hu's 2021 analysis, based on palyazat.gov.hu data, examined how EU funds were distributed between Fidesz-led and opposition-led county seats after the 2019 municipal elections. The results show clear disproportionality.
Source: G7.hu, based on palyazat.gov.hu data (2021). Blue = opposition-led, orange = Fidesz-led since 2019. Poorer opposition cities received less funding than wealthier Fidesz ones – contradicting the EU's cohesion policy aimed at helping poorer regions catch up.
Source: G7.hu (2021). The six municipalities receiving the most funding are all Fidesz-led. Székesfehérvár (the wealthiest county seat) received 12+ Bn HUF; Salgótarján (the poorest, opposition-led) received only 20 million HUF.
The picture is even more extreme for Hungarian Tourism Agency (MTÜ) grants: Fidesz-led municipalities received over HUF 32 billion, while opposition-led ones received a total of HUF 68 million. Illustrative city pairs: Esztergom (Fidesz) HUF 5 Bn vs. similarly-sized Szentendre (opposition) HUF 30 million; Debrecen (Fidesz) HUF 5.2 Bn vs. Miskolc (opposition) 0.2% of that; Balatonfüred (Fidesz) HUF 6.3 Bn vs. twice-as-large opposition-led Siófok: HUF 0.
Source: G7.hu (2021). Comparison of similarly sized and functionally comparable city pairs.
The Faktum Projekt (2025) and some pro-government analysts point out that several opposition cities (e.g. Budapest, Tatabánya, Salgótarján) received significant EU funding in aggregate over the full 2014–2024 period. The disproportionality is most striking in the post-2019 period, in discretionary (government-decided) grants, and especially in tourism funding. CEU/Defacto researchers (2024) also noted that political favoritism is statistically demonstrable primarily in settlements above 3,000 inhabitants and in the government's own discretionary funding decisions.
Prosecutor's Office is not unique: in Poland, the PiS government used similar methods to punish opposition cities. The Polish Supreme Audit Office (NIK) revealed in 2024 that Warsaw received only 0.8% of the fund, despite generating 4% of national income tax revenue. Some PiS-aligned municipalities received 100–140 times more per capita. The NIK filed criminal charges against former PM Morawiecki.
The Hungarian Village Program launched in 2019 is funded exclusively from the domestic budget (not EU sources) for settlements under 5,000 inhabitants. While the program is widely accessible, viewed as a whole system, urban (typically opposition-led) municipalities' room for maneuver is radically decreasing, while rural (typically Fidesz-aligned) settlements' support is increasing.
Rule of law conditions, fund freezing, OLAF – chronology
The European Union has been trying to sanction the misuse of EU funds in Hungary with increasingly strong tools since 2018. The timeline below documents the EU's most important steps.
The chart marks key events. Detailed descriptions below.
42 key events – 2010 to 2026
All data comes from public sources
This compilation works exclusively from publicly accessible sources: academic studies, OLAF reports, municipal documents, and independent media articles. The CRCB's procurement database is the only regular, statistically grounded source for measuring corruption risks in Hungary. This page strives to present phenomena objectively, and where relevant, mentions counter-arguments.
The CRCB's methodology was challenged by the Public Procurement Authority, and a court partially ruled in its favor regarding a specific 2018 study. The pro-government outlet Mandiner also questioned the CRCB's funding and staff political affiliations. However, CRCB's work is used by the European Parliament, the European Commission, and international research institutes, and the közpénzkereső.hu (tendertracking.eu) database is publicly available. We do not claim all EU funds are distributed corruptly – this documentation focuses on systemic patterns.