Fidesz Archive

The first round was held on April 11, the second on April 25. Fidesz-KDNP received 52.73% of list votes.

April 25, 2010: Fidesz-KDNP wins 263 seats out of 386 (68%). MSZP collapses (59 seats). The two-thirds majority enables complete concentration of power. Made possible by the failures of 8 years of socialist-liberal governments (Oszod speech, economic crisis, IMF loan). Orban immediately begins transforming the system.

The new government immediately begins restructuring public administration and making political appointments.

The bank tax was levied at a rate of 0.5% above 0.45% of banks' balance sheet totals.

Establishment of NMHH and the Media Council, whose members are nominated exclusively by Fidesz.

The Constitutional Court may not review budget-related legislation if the national debt exceeds 50% of GDP.

The Fidesz government attributes the disaster to negligence by the previous governments.

Peter Polt (Fidesz member 1993-95) served as Prosecutor General: 2000-2006, then again from 2010. Re-elected for another 9 years in 2019. In 2025 he resigns and is elected to the Constitutional Court – intended to become its president. According to Atlatszo data, the prosecution systematically fails to bring charges in Fidesz-linked corruption cases.

Media Council members are elected for 9 years, exclusively with governing party votes. A flood of international criticism follows.

The 2010 media law entrusts the entire media regulation to a Media Council elected solely by Fidesz votes. MTVA (Media and Communications Support and Asset Management Fund) centralizes all public media resources. Public television and media become entirely a tool for government propaganda. RSF: media freedom under severe threat.

The European Parliament holds a debate on the Hungarian media situation.

Orban outlines a 'five-year plan': 2010 unity, 2011 renewal, 2012 takeoff, 2013 rise, 2014 growth. He announces the need for a new constitution that is a manifestation of the Hungarian spirit, distancing from the 'era of misery.' Key issues: constitution and economic stabilization.

Controversial elements: marriage defined as between man and woman, protection of the fetus from conception. The Venice Commission raises concerns.

The opposition and civil organizations did not participate in the constitution-making process. No referendum, no substantive consensus. The Venice Commission severely criticizes the one-sided process. The Fundamental Law includes: God, Christianity, marriage as a male-female relationship, fetal protection. Fidesz adopted it alone with its two-thirds majority.

The persecution of the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET) and pastor Gabor Ivanyi is one of the NER's longest, most cynical and most systematic campaigns. Ivanyi has special symbolic significance: he officiated the wedding of Viktor Orban and Aniko Levai in 1986. The once close friend and pastor became a political enemy.

Social science program quotas are drastically reduced.

Approximately 3 million people are forced to return to the state pension system.

Possibility of criminalizing homelessness, tying church recognition to parliamentary approval.

Key changes: 1. 199-member parliament instead of 386, 2. single-round instead of two-round voting, 3. introduction of winner compensation (unprecedented), 4. redrawing constituency borders (gerrymandering) to favor Fidesz, 5. voting rights for ethnic Hungarians abroad (by mail, for party lists), 6. constituency boundaries redrawn to Fidesz's advantage.

Previous Constitutional Court decisions are annulled. Mass protests in Budapest.

Schools, hospitals and social institutions were taken into state maintenance. Municipalities lost a significant portion of their revenues. Freedom of local taxation was restricted. The powers of the Budapest municipal government were also narrowed.

2011: new Public Education Act. Key changes: (1) nationalization of schools from municipalities to KLIK (Klebelsberg Center). (2) Nationalization of the textbook market (single state publisher). (3) Centralized curriculum.

Appointment of judges, case distribution – international criticism over threats to judicial independence.

January 11, 2012: HVG discovered that 197 pages of Schmitt's 1992 doctoral thesis (out of 215) were word-for-word copies of works by Bulgarian sports researcher Nikolay Georgiev and German professor Klaus Heinemann. Semmelweis University revoked the doctoral degree.

Jozsef Angyan (Ministry of Rural Development state secretary, 2010-12) resigns because the 'Land for Farmers!' program in reality channels state lands to NER-connected entrepreneurs. In 2013 he leaves the Fidesz caucus. He prepares county-by-county reports documenting how state lands end up with NER oligarchs.

Orban names three problems: debt trap, lost dignity of work, lack of reserves. Speech on tax reform, public works program, vocational training reform, higher education reorganization. Foreshadows utility cost cuts and the eastern opening policy.

Semmelweis University revokes the doctoral degree. His successor is Janos Ader.

Pal Schmitt (2010-12): resigned due to plagiarism scandal. Janos Ader (2012-22): did not return a single Fidesz law, signed everything. Katalin Novak (2022-24): resigned due to the pardon scandal (presidential pardon in a pedophilia case). Tamas Sulyok (2024-): Constitutional Court president turned president, Orban-loyal.

274 judges removed through forced retirement.

The Azerbaijani officer killed his sleeping Armenian roommate with an axe in Budapest during a NATO course. After extradition, he becomes a national hero in Azerbaijan. Armenia breaks diplomatic relations with Hungary.

Azerbaijani officer Ramil Safarov murdered his sleeping Armenian colleague (Gurgen Margaryan, NATO English course) with an axe in Budapest in 2004. Sentenced to life. In August 2012, Hungary extradites him to Azerbaijan, where President Aliyev immediately pardons and promotes him.

Single-round system, ethnic Hungarians abroad can vote by mail.

In 2012, Fidesz lowered the mandatory retirement age for judges and prosecutors to 62. The European Commission launched infringement proceedings. The CJEU found a violation. The aim: appointing Fidesz-loyal judges to vacated positions.

The program offered residence permits to non-EU citizens for purchasing Hungarian government bonds. Intermediary fees (EUR 40,000-60,000) went to Fidesz-linked business circles. Corruption and security risks: clients were not properly vetted.

In 2011, only 14 of 362 registered churches retained automatic recognition. The rest had to reapply – the parliamentary two-thirds majority decided. The CJEU found a violation in 2014: the church recognition system violates freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination.

Through the TAO (corporate tax incentive) system, companies could redirect their taxes to sports clubs. Felcsut Puskas Academy: a 3,500-seat stadium in a village of 3,800. Puskas Arena: HUF 190 billion. Total: approximately HUF 1,000 billion spent on stadiums.

From 2013, the government reduced gas, electricity and water prices several times (totaling ~25%). The main Fidesz campaign message. In 2022, during the energy crisis, an upper limit for the utility cuts was introduced (above-average consumption at market price).

April 18, 2011: adoption of new Fundamental Law (voted in the opposition's absence). January 1, 2012: enters into force. 2012-2024: 14 amendments. Key transformations: (1) narrowing Constitutional Court jurisdiction, appointing Fidesz members. (2) Media authority: exclusively Fidesz nominees.

Key figures of the NER propaganda machine: (1) Zsolt Bayer: Hungarian Hirlap columnist, Orban's childhood friend, known for anti-Roma ('it's not necessarily the case that these animals should choose life') and homophobic writings, Taszar Prize winner (2016).

Orban declares debt reduction a success. 90,300 children born in 2012 (+2,251). Announces utility cost cuts: reduction of gas, electricity, district heating prices. Dismisses EU budget forecasts: 'don't let them confuse you.'

Incorporates previously annulled Transitional Provisions, restricts the Constitutional Court.

Fidesz circumvents Constitutional Court decisions by writing provisions found unconstitutional by the CC back into the Fundamental Law. The Venice Commission and the EP severely criticize this: 'emptying constitutional oversight.' The amendment eliminates the CC's ability to review.

In March 2013, hundreds of cars were stranded on the M1. Disaster management responded late, the rescue was chaotic. According to Sandor Pinter, the drivers were to blame for setting out.

The program ran until 2017, with thousands of Chinese and Middle Eastern citizens receiving residence permits. The intermediary companies are linked to Fidesz-connected individuals.

Numerous previous owners lost their livelihoods.

Pharaon appears on the FBI's wanted list. He purchases Hungarian real estate worth hundreds of millions. The case highlights the selective approach of Hungarian authorities.

The National Tobacconist system monopolized the tobacco trade in 2013. Audio recordings prove (Akos Hadhazy, Szekszard): Fidesz constituency chairs decided on the concessions. Mayors and local Fidesz leaders distributed them based on political loyalty.

Simicska was at this time Orban's closest oligarch.

KLIK (later Klebelsberg Center) manages all state schools. Teachers lose their pedagogical freedom. Nationalization of the textbook market, uniform textbooks. International criticism: OECD PISA results deteriorate. Teachers organize protests.

Through the deal, the party profits by billions from the property received from public funds. The opposition accuses Fidesz of breach of fiduciary duty.

The decisions of the National Land Fund Management Organization are non-transparent. Janos Lazar, Lorinc Meszaros and other government-linked persons acquire vast land areas.

Habony officially holds no government position, yet was Hungary's 4th most influential person (2014-15). He brought Orban together with Arthur Finkelstein (American campaign specialist). He built up the Fidesz media machine and propaganda strategy.

'Eastern opening' policy since 2012. Elements: (1) China: Fudan University, battery factories, BRI railway, Huawei partnership. (2) Turkey: Erdogan-Orban friendship, Turkish investments, Turkish schools. (3) Azerbaijan: Ramil Safarov affair.

Rosatom is commissioned without a tender. The contract is classified for 30 years. Original deadline: 2023. By 2025: construction has not even begun, deadline slipped to 2032. Cost exceeds EUR 12 billion. Financed by Russian loan. The case exemplifies energy dependency.

Voting is organized especially from Transcarpathia and Transylvania. Postal votes arrive almost exclusively for Fidesz. Allegations of manipulation arise.

Orban declares: they replaced the post-communist system. 'We stand on the threshold of a period of ascent.' The memory of the Gyurcsany era: 'we lied morning, noon and night.' Announcements: cheapest energy in Europe, utility cost cuts, family policy measures.

According to the OSCE, the election was 'free but not fair.'

Fidesz again wins a two-thirds majority in the electoral system it designed itself, with 44.87% of list votes. Winner compensation, redrawn constituency borders and cross-border votes all favor Fidesz. The opposition is divided.

In 2012, Fidesz replaced the data protection commissioner with its own nominee. In 2014, the CJEU upheld the Commission's claim. The ruling could not be reversed: Andras Jori was not reinstated.

The statement becomes a symbol illustrating the gap between the political elite and everyday reality.

Norway suspends grants to Hungary over pressure on civil organizations. KEHI launches an investigation on 'money laundering' suspicion.

June 2, 2014: Origo.hu editor-in-chief Andras Gergo is dismissed with immediate effect. The reason: Origo exposed that Janos Lazar (Minister heading the PM's Office) took luxury trips at the taxpayers' expense.

The speech is a defining moment in Hungarian politics. International reverberations.

In this historically significant speech, Orban openly embraces building an alternative to liberal democracy. The international press reacts with shock. The term 'illiberal' becomes the label of the NER. Orban cites China, Turkey, Russia as examples.

The measure also affects NAV executives.

The previously free textbook market is dismantled. Teachers cannot freely choose textbooks. Quality deteriorates, publishers go bankrupt.

The government ultimately withdraws the proposal — a rare retreat.

The 'green dossier' published by Andre Goodfriend documents systemic corruption within the tax authority. NAV president Ildiko Vida and others are implicated.

October 2014: the government announces the internet tax in the 2015 budget. Protests of a hundred thousand on Kossuth Square. Demonstrators march for free internet and against the Orban system. Fidesz retreats: first limits it, then fully withdraws the plan.

The film mogul was the sole concession holder until his death in 2019. The casino business's billion-forint revenue flows through non-transparent channels.

Poster campaigns against Soros, Juncker, Karacsony, Marki-Zay, Peter Magyar. The method: demonization, conspiracy theories, personal attacks.

The Szazadveg Foundation receives HUF 5-10 billion annually in state commissions for public opinion research and strategic consulting. The results systematically support the Fidesz narrative.

Antal Rogan heads the Fidesz communications machine, directing all state propaganda from national consultations to the Soros campaign. He runs the Cabinet Office, which is also responsible for distributing state advertising (HUF 100+ billion annually). In 2025 he was placed on the US sanctions list.

The Fidesz government has systematically classified data of public interest since 2010. Key examples: (1) Paks II contract: classified for 30 years (2014), (2) highway concession: secret annexes, (3) arms procurement and military spending.

The Buda-Cash brokerage's HUF 100+ billion fraud exposed deficiencies in the supervisory system. Clients lost billions. MNB's supervisory responsibility is questionable.

The government begins building its own media empire without Simicska.

Lajos Simicska (Orban's university roommate) was Fidesz's economic background man since 2002. His company Kozgep won HUF 93 billion in public procurement in 2014. After the split in 2015, only HUF 1.3 billion; in 2016, nothing. The system's essence: private wealth from public funds.

February 6, 2015 (G-Day): Lajos Simicska, Orban's university roommate, Fidesz's former economic director and billionaire oligarch, publicly split with Orban.

Orban lists achievements since 2010: sending home the IMF, taxing banks, utility cost cuts, breaking inflation. 'Who would have thought a few years ago that Hungary could stand on its own feet?' Restoring national self-respect is the main theme.

The company sold fictitious bonds for years. Supervision and the MNB delayed intervention. The state eventually compensates victims.

The collapse of Quaestor Securities causes HUF 200 billion in damage. The company is linked to Fidesz-connected persons. Supervisory bodies (MNB, PSZAF) did not act in time. The case exposes systemic deficiencies in Hungarian financial supervision. CEO Csaba Tarsoly faces criminal proceedings.

Since 2010, Fidesz has regularly held so-called 'national consultations' — postal questionnaires and online surveys with biased questions. Major consultations: (1) Anti-immigration (2015): laying the groundwork for the migration campaign. (2) 'Stop Soros' (2017).

Since 2010, approximately 12 national consultations have been held (immigration, Soros plan, Brussels, COVID, sanctions, etc.). The questions are systematically suggestive: the answer always supports the government's position. The real purpose: a propaganda tool.

Rahel Orban is a public foundation board member, with a luxury apartment and lifestyle, and NER-linked business connections. The 'diaper-throwing' incident becomes a symbol of the luxurious lifestyle.

Hungary becomes a symbol of the refugee crisis in Europe.

The car has civilian plates with special communication and security equipment. The 'laser car' becomes a symbol of government waste.

The UN and the EU also criticize the response.

At Orban's personal request, a new stadium (Pancho Arena) is built in Felcsut: a 3,500-seat stadium in a village of 3,800. The cost: ~HUF 4 billion, primarily from TAO funds. Puskas Academy becomes a first-division team.

The investment would cost ~EUR 2.1 billion from a Chinese loan. The EU launches an investigation into procurement irregularities. Details are classified for 10 years.

Semjen shoots protected and rare animals, posting photos with the trophies. The source of the hunting costs is questionable. Animal rights groups protest.

The government withdraws the plan for administrative courts under EU and international criticism. The plan: a separate administrative high court whose president would be appointed by the President of the Republic (effectively Fidesz control).

Under Gyorgy Matolcsy's leadership, the MNB channeled hundreds of billions into 6 foundations, which then spent them on real estate, artworks and NER interests. The foundations received ~HUF 270 billion in public funds.

A video recording is made of the incident at the National Electoral Office. The police do not intervene.

Orban declares: Europe wants to 'colonize' Hungary with its migration policy. The Soros campaign intensifies. Another wave of national consultation. The speech is the opening of the 2018 election campaign: migration, Soros, national sovereignty.

March 15, 2016: columnist Zsolt Bayer received the Taszar Prize. Bayer had previously written about Roma: 'it's not necessarily the case that these animals should choose life.'

Nacionalinės romų savivaldos veikla ir finansų valdymas jau daugelį metų yra netransparentūs. Milijardinių romų integracijos fondų poveikis išlieka minimalus.

Jo Zalos valdoje įrengti atrakcionai, įskaitant amerikietiškus kalnelius ir prabangų poilsio parką. Jo turto kilmė jau daugelį metų kelia klausimų.

The campaign costs approximately HUF 15 billion. 98% vote no, but it is invalid.

According to the editorial staff, a political decision lies behind it.

Nepszabadsag had been operating since 1956. Austrian investor Heinrich Pecina (NER-linked) bought Mediaworks. On October 8, 2016, the building is locked in front of the editorial staff. International press: 'the death of press freedom in Hungary.'

October 8, 2016: Mediaworks (Fidesz-linked owner: Heinrich Pecina, later Gabor Liszkay) unexpectedly suspends the publication of Nepszabadsag. The editorial staff is locked out of the building, archives are sealed.

A HUF 3.5 billion miniature railway and the Pancho Arena stadium are built with TAO money in a village of 3,800. The disproportion of investments becomes symbolic.

The charge: Simonka and associates used fictitious invoices to extract ~HUF 1.4 billion in EU agricultural subsidies. The case drags on for years.

The defense state secretary's style is characteristic of NER political communication: aggressive, stigmatizing, incapable of compromise. He regularly conducts hate campaigns.

Viktor Orban's decade-long ally was Lajos Simicska (Kozgep, HirTV, Magyar Nemzet, Lanchid Radio). Public split in February 2015: Simicska calls Orban a 'scumbag' on live broadcast.

The launch of the anti-Soros campaign. Orban positions himself as a leader of the global conservative turn.

The government launches a years-long, publicly funded propaganda campaign against George Soros. Poster campaigns, national consultations, parliamentary laws ('Stop Soros'). The campaign totals ~HUF 100 billion.

Foreign universities must maintain a campus in their home country.

The law was clearly aimed against the CEU founded by George Soros. International protests, EP condemnation, CJEU ruling (Hungary loses). CEU moves to Vienna in 2019. Thousands of students and researchers lost to Budapest.

NGOs receiving more than HUF 7.2 million annually from abroad must register separately.

In 2019, the government took the MTA research network from the Academy and reorganized it into the newly created ELKH. Academic autonomy was undermined.

OLAF reveals serious irregularities. The Hungarian prosecution nonetheless closes the investigation.

Hungary (together with Poland and Czech Republic) refused the EU's 2015 refugee relocation decision. The CJEU rules the decision was lawful. Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland violated EU law.

From 2018, habitual residence on public property becomes a misdemeanor. The Constitutional Court is circumvented via constitutional amendment. International and civil protests.

The renovation, which began in 2017, is not fully completed even by 2023. Costs grow to multiples of the planned amount.

In 2015, Fidesz left the EPP group (not the party), and in 2021 it also left the EPP. The group amended its rules to allow suspension of member parties.

Domestic and international courts regularly find that government media publishes falsehoods. According to Atlatszo data, between 2017-2024, government-linked media lost ~500 lawsuits.

Lorinc Meszaros, Viktor Orban's Felcsut neighbor, grows his wealth from HUF 7.7 billion (2014) to HUF 1,749 billion (2025). Public procurement, state concessions, EU tenders, bank acquisition (MKB Bank).

The Fidesz communications apparatus (directed by Antal Rogan) employs a systematic distraction strategy. The method: (1) when a scandal erupts (corruption, scandal, EU proceedings), the government immediately introduces a new topic.

MTVA (public media) receives HUF 80-130 billion annually in public funds — and broadcasts exclusively government propaganda. Public service news programs give no substantive speaking opportunity to the opposition.

The peak of the 2018 election campaign. Orban acknowledges: 'the country does not yet perform as it could.' But: the goal is work, not redistribution.

The deal is an obvious straw man construction, but has no legal consequences. A typical method in the NER for hiding wealth.

Dozens of fake parties receive state campaign funding. The system allows parties to disappear after receiving financing.

According to the OSCE, it was 'free but not fair.' Turnout: 70.22%.

With the anti-immigration campaign, Fidesz wins a two-thirds majority for the third time. The anti-Soros campaign, one-sided public media and the divided opposition ensure victory.

Family businesses receive orders from MNB foundations. The intertwining of the central bank president's private life and public funds generates scandals.

According to the Helsinki Committee, it violates fundamental rights.

The law criminally sanctions assistance to refugees ('supporting illegal immigration'). Civil organizations pay a special tax. The CJEU declares it unlawful in 2021.

MTVA operates with a HUF 130+ billion annual budget; state advertising systematically feeds government media. Public media serves entirely as Fidesz propaganda.

For the first time, the EP initiates such proceedings against a member state.

Judith Sargentini's (Dutch Green MEP) report reveals systemic rule of law problems: lack of judicial independence, corruption, press freedom, academic freedom, minority rights.

The coal-based power plant becomes increasingly loss-making. The state provides CO2 quotas and other means to keep Meszaros's investment alive.

The Fundamental Law was amended to state: 'habitual use of public space is prohibited.' The Constitutional Court had previously annulled similar regulation, so Fidesz elevated it to the Fundamental Law — making it unreviewable by the CC.

The Central European Press and Media Foundation becomes Hungary's largest media empire. The government declares it 'of strategic importance,' bypassing competition authority review.

The Hungarian government does not fulfill the operational conditions.

With the creation of KESMA, 476 media outlets are placed in a single Fidesz-linked foundation. The government declares the merger of national strategic importance — thus the Competition Authority cannot review it.

In 2018, ~500 media outlets are merged into a single Fidesz-linked foundation. The donations are 'voluntary' — in reality, political pressure was exerted on the owners.

The administrative courts would create a new branch of judiciary subordinated to the government.

Parliament adopts the overtime law (slave law): 400 hours of annual overtime allowed, payable after 3 years. The law was made for the lobby of German car manufacturers. Weeks of protests follow.

Independent MP Akos Hadhazy single-handedly exposes NER corruption worth hundreds of billions. Key revelations: Hatvanpuszta (Orban estate), tobacco shop scheme (audio recording from Szekszard), EU tender fraud.

In December 2018, the protests against the overtime law ('slave law') and the occupation of the MTVA headquarters mark a historic moment. Opposition MPs (Hadhazy, Szel, Donath, etc.) read out their demands on live television.

The system directed by Gabor Kubatov, Fidesz party director, collects data door-to-door. NAIH launches an investigation, but no substantive sanctions follow.

Sports investments and related real estate developments end up with Fidesz-connected entrepreneurs.

From 2019, the government reorganizes state universities into foundations one by one: Corvinus, Theatre and Film Arts, Moholy-Nagy, Neumann, Veterinary, etc. Board chairs: Fidesz-connected figures.

Cultural centralization accelerates from 2019. Theatres: Attila Vidnyanszky (National Theatre, SZFE board) as Fidesz's 'cultural weapon.'

Istvan Tiborcz (Orban's son-in-law) company Elios Zrt.'s street lighting projects. OLAF investigation: procurement fraud suspicion. The Hungarian prosecution (Peter Polt) closes the investigation; no one is charged.

Since 2010, Fidesz has spent ~5% of GDP on family policy measures (EU peak). Main tools: CSOK (Family Housing Allowance) - housing subsidy per child; CSOK Plus (2024).

Family policy expansion: CSOK expansion, 7-point family protection action plan. Climate action plan adopted.

Under Gyorgy Matolcsy (MNB president since 2013), the MNB became the NER's financial center. (1) MNB foundations: ~HUF 270 billion in public money into 6 foundations (Pallas Athene) - London property purchases, luxury spending.

Fidesz voluntarily leaves in 2021.

The 'Csengeri heiress' case highlights how Fidesz-connected persons acquire the assets of vulnerable people.

The MNB's six foundations purchase luxury real estate and collect artworks. MNB President Gyorgy Matolcsy's ex-wife and family members are also involved.

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences research network was placed under the government-created ELKH in 2019. The ELKH president is appointed by the Prime Minister. MTA President Laszlo Lovasz: 'a violation of scientific independence.'

Nepszabadsag, Hungary's largest-circulation daily, ceases overnight in October 2016. The owner's (Mediaworks, Fidesz-linked) justification: economic reasons. In reality, a political decision.

Fidesz MP Gyorgy Simonka is charged with HUF 1.4 billion budget fraud in an organized group. EU tender manipulation, fictitious invoices, offshore companies. The trial drags on for years. Simonka's immunity was lifted.

Attila Vidnyanszky becomes board chair. Students and faculty blockade the university for months. The case becomes a symbol of cultural freedom.

Mengyi Roland received the 'Voldemort' nickname because his name was long taboo in Fidesz media. The case: systemic EU tender fraud in which Mengyi served as intermediary between applicants and decision-makers.

The recordings were made on a yacht in May 2018. The scandal erupts 10 days before the municipal elections. Borkai wins the election but resigns in November.

The Borkai videos were filmed on an Adriatic yacht; luxury trips were financed by Fidesz entrepreneurs. The scandal erupts before the 2019 municipal elections.

Fidesz's first significant electoral setback.

The European People's Party (EPP) suspends Fidesz membership over rule of law concerns, the anti-Soros campaign and the CEU affair. The suspension leads to Fidesz's departure in 2021.

The stadium construction program continues nationwide: Felcsut, Debrecen, Szekesfehervar. The disproportion between sports investments and social spending generates political debates.

The central bank president (Gyorgy Matolcsy) channels hundreds of billions in public money to NER interests through foundations. MNB Pallas Athene foundations purchase luxury real estate and artworks.

Budapest, Pecs, Miskolc, Szeged and other cities see their business tax reduced, institutions taken away. The God model spreads.

Thousands of doctors leave the country. Hospital debt grows, care deteriorates. The COVID pandemic reveals catastrophic conditions.

In several Hungarian settlements, Roma children are segregated into separate schools or classes. The European Commission launches an investigation.

Hungary spends the least on healthcare in the EU (as a proportion of GDP). Thousands of doctors and nurses leave (2010-2024: ~10,000 doctors). Hospital closures, mergers, emergency department closings.

The government transforms the court system: the heads of key judicial bodies are Fidesz-connected persons. The plan to create administrative courts (2018-19) provoked international protests — ultimately suspended.

Systematic restriction of civil liberties: limiting the right of assembly, intimidating civil organizations, eroding media freedom, curtailing academic freedom. Freedom House classifies Hungary as 'partly free' in 2019.

Gyongyospata: the court awarded compensation to segregated Roma students — the government was outraged and amended the constitution to prevent similar rulings.

Since 2010, Fidesz has systematically steered education toward church control. 2010: church schools ~10%, 2024: ~25%. Church schools receive 2-3 times more state funding than public schools.

The ambassador is brought home and given a suspended prison sentence and a HUF 540,000 fine — the lenient sentence causes outrage. The Foreign Ministry tries to silence the scandal.

Systematic exclusion of Roma: public works, school segregation, housing discrimination, hate speech. The ECHR has condemned Hungary multiple times.

Emotional speech: 'We are not the people we appear to be.' The 10-year record: IMF independence, 8 national consultations, family support. The 'communist with a degree' expression sparks major debate.

During the COVID pandemic, the government receives unlimited power: governance by decree without parliamentary control. The state of emergency is extended multiple times. Ventilator procurements are non-transparent: expensive, unsuitable machines.

'Scaremongering': up to 5 years in prison. 13 EU member states protest in a joint statement.

In spring 2020, the government ordered 16,000 ventilators, though the medical profession deemed only a fraction necessary. The procurement was led by Peter Szijjarto — intermediary companies (including Fidesz-linked businesses) profited hundreds of billions.

Hungary purchases one of the world's largest ventilator quantities; most are never used. Among the intermediary companies are Fidesz-linked businesses.

The Constitutional Court has gradually lost its independence since 2010. Fidesz appoints its own people with the two-thirds majority (11/15 members are Fidesz nominees). The CC's jurisdiction is narrowed: it cannot review fiscal legislation.

The move deprives God of ~HUF 4 billion in annual revenue. The government systematically withdraws resources from opposition municipalities.

After the editor-in-chief's dismissal, everyone resigns. Fidesz-linked owners.

Editor-in-chief Szabolcs Dull was removed because he announced that the paper's independence was in danger. Andras Szlavics took over (Fidesz-linked business connection). 80+ journalists resigned.

The minister claims it was a friendly invitation. Laszlo Szijj's companies receive billion-forint state contracts; the relationship raises conflict-of-interest concerns.

In summer 2020, the government removed SZFE from state control and handed it to a Fidesz-linked foundation. Attila Vidnyanszky (director of the National Theatre) became board chair. Students blockaded the university for weeks.

Megafon launched in 2020: paid political influencers systematically smearing the opposition. Daniel Deak and associates operate with billion-forint budgets. Financing comes from public funds through foundations.

Szijjarto's Dunakeszi villa, regular luxury flights and Maldives holidays are incompatible with a ministerial salary.

Fidesz MP Istvan Boldog is convicted for EU tender fraud. The case is similar to the Mengyi Roland affair: EU tender manipulation, intermediary fees, fictitious performance.

A compromise is eventually reached.

Szajer wrote the male-female definition of marriage into the Fundamental Law and supported anti-LGBTQ policy. An ecstasy tablet is found in his backpack. He resigns his EP mandate and leaves Fidesz.

Szilard Demeter (director of the Petofi Literary Museum, Fidesz-linked cultural politician) published an antisemitic article in 2020 comparing Soros to Hitler. International outrage, but Demeter kept his position.

Jozsef Szajer, Fidesz co-founder and MEP, was caught at an illegal Brussels sex party in November 2020. He fled from police through the drainpipe; drugs were found in his backpack. The scandal is particularly damaging because he authored the anti-LGBTQ provisions.

Restriction of transgender rights, making adoption more difficult.

The CJEU finds that Hungary failed to implement the 2015 refugee relocation quota. The government rejected the quota on principle. The quota referendum (2016) was invalid due to low turnout.

The CJEU rules that Hungarian transit zones (Roszke, Tompa) constitute unlawful detention. Asylum seekers could not leave the zones but were not formally detained. The government closed the zones in 2020 — under the CJEU ruling.

Decades of healthcare underfunding, doctor shortages and late measures contribute to high mortality. The procurement of Chinese and Russian vaccines generates political debates.

Daniel Deak and other Fidesz opinion leaders spread government propaganda on YouTube and social media. Financing comes from public funds through foundations.

The 'Voldemort affair' name originates from the fact that the person involved could not be named in media for a long time. The investigation drags on for years.

Klubradio had been broadcasting since 2001. The Media Council (Fidesz-controlled body) refuses to renew the frequency license citing minor formal errors. International outrage: EP, RSF, CPJ, even the US criticize the decision. The radio can only broadcast online.

The government would establish a Chinese state Fudan University in Budapest through a secret agreement. Cost: ~HUF 540 billion, from Chinese loans. It would have been built on the site of the student city. Mass protests: streets renamed (Free Hong Kong Street, Dalai Lama Street).

Fidesz MP Florian Farkas (of Roma origin) faces budget fraud charges. EU integration program funds ended up with NER-linked companies.

Hungarian police used force against refugees at the Serbian border during the 2015 migration crisis. Tear gas, water cannon, response to fence-breaking attempts. International criticism.

Defends the procurement of Chinese and Russian vaccines. Economic restart program. Family protection during the pandemic. Criticizes EU vaccine procurement failures. 'We go forward, not backward.'

The series is produced on MTVA commission, reflecting the government narrative. Viewership is catastrophically low relative to the public money invested.

Orban seeks new allies among far-right parties.

The European People's Party (EPP) suspended Fidesz membership in 2019 over rule of law concerns. In March 2021, before a vote on expelling Fidesz, Orban leaves 'of his own will.'

Board chairs: Lorinc Meszaros, Rahel Orban and others.

In spring 2021, Hungary was in the world's top 3 for per capita deaths. Nearly 50,000 COVID deaths total. The government purchased Sinopharm and Sputnik vaccines for political reasons — their efficacy was questioned.

Between 2010-2024, 324,000+ Hungarian citizens emigrated, mainly to Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom. Emigrants are typically young, educated — doctors, engineers, IT professionals.

First application of the EU conditionality mechanism. 17 reform measures as conditions (judiciary, procurement, anti-corruption). The government fulfills some, but by 2025 ~EUR 10 billion remains frozen.

The plan provokes huge protests. Budapest's mayor renames streets to 'Free Hong Kong Road' and 'Dalai Lama Road.' The project is ultimately postponed.

Promotion of homosexuality banned for those under 18. 17 EU member states condemn it.

The law hides LGBTQ content restrictions among anti-pedophilia rules. LGBTQ 'propaganda' banned for those under 18. The law is modeled on the Russian 'propaganda law.'

June 15, 2021: parliament adopts the anti-pedophilia law amendment with LGBTQ content restrictions for those under 18 inserted. The law: (1) bans LGBTQ topics in schools and children's media.

At least 300 Hungarian targets, including investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi.

In 2016, Fidesz held a referendum on the EU refugee relocation quota. Result: 98% against, but only 43% turnout — invalid. The government nonetheless communicates it as 'successful.'

Journalists (e.g. Direkt36 staff), lawyers, opposition politicians, businesspeople. The government did not clearly deny the use of Pegasus.

Meszaros-linked companies receive the investment. UNESCO and environmental organizations also protest. The project is eventually modified.

Schadl earned ~HUF 880 million illegally for influencing bailiff appointments. Volner received HUF 2-5 million monthly, HUF 83 million total. 22 defendants; prosecution seeks 10 years for Schadl, 8 for Volner.

Final ruling: the Budapest Court of Appeal found that TV2's Tenyek program violated the personal rights of Emma Krasznahorkai and Mariann Filo, organizers of the December 14, 2018 anti-slave law protest.

Gyorgy Schadl regularly gave cash (HUF 2-5 million monthly) to Pal Volner from 2018 in exchange for bailiff appointments. HUF 83 million in total bribes.

COVID pandemic mass ventilator procurement via intermediary companies. Machines far above market price; many didn't meet hospital requirements.

Teachers are among the worst-paid government employees in the EU. Students also join. The government responds by restricting the right to strike.

Historic teacher strikes and civil disobedience. 2022: teachers launch a civil disobedience movement — several are fired. The government restricts the right to strike.

Looks back on the 100th anniversary of Trianon. Calls the opposition 'the empire's agents.' The shadow of war: Russian-Ukrainian tensions already felt.

Public media and the KESMA empire spread the Russian narrative: NATO responsibility, Ukraine provocation. Szijjarto's regular Moscow visits.

Hungary is the only EU member state that regularly obstructs Ukrainian support. Orban: 'peace is needed, not weapons.' He refuses arms transit through Hungarian territory. Veto threats on EU sanctions.

February 2022: Russia attacks Ukraine. Orban's position: (1) 'peace rhetoric' — but does not demand Russia stop, only that Ukraine negotiate. (2) Opposing sanctions: because of utility cost cuts and Russian energy dependency.

The state awards system rewards political loyalty rather than professional merit. The value of the Kossuth Prize is devalued.

The OSCE again gives a 'free but not fair' assessment.

Fidesz wins a two-thirds majority even against the fully united opposition. PM candidate Peter Marki-Zay cannot overcome Fidesz's media dominance and state machinery. OSCE: 'the election was free but marred by significant inequality.'

Fidesz won with a 20-30x media advantage, government resources and gerrymandering (deliberate political redrawing of constituencies). The OSCE/ODIHR report notes significant inequality.

The comment into the microphone confirms the opposition's claim that Fidesz deliberately organizes the electoral result rather than winning through democratic competition alone.

The first time the mechanism is actually applied.

Since March 2020, there has been practically uninterrupted state of emergency. Parliamentary control is minimal; the government overrides laws by decree.

The government changes KATA rules: from September 2022, KATA taxpayers may only invoice private individuals. Hundreds of thousands protest online. The change affects ~300,000 entrepreneurs.

The change affects ~450,000 small taxpayers. Only businesses serving exclusively private individuals may remain. Mass protests.

From September 2022, MKIF Zrt. (Meszaros + Szijj, 7 private equity funds) receives operation of 1,666 km of motorways for 35 years. Contract value: HUF 15-17 trillion.

Acceleration of Article 7 proceedings is urged.

2022 census results: Hungary's population is 9,604,000 (official figure). This is 400,000 fewer than in 2011. Rural depopulation has accelerated.

Hungary is among the OECD's lowest teacher salaries. The government fires protesting teachers. Students also join the protests.

Hungary regularly threatens vetoes or blocks common decisions within the EU. Key cases: obstructing Ukraine's EU accession negotiations, weakening sanctions against Russia.

December 2022: the EU Council approves the conditionality procedure result: ~EUR 6.3 billion in cohesion support frozen. Plus Recovery Plan: ~EUR 5.8 billion withheld.

First application of the conditionality mechanism. 17 reform measures as conditions (judiciary, procurement, anti-corruption). The government fulfills some, but by 2025 ~EUR 10 billion in EU funds remain frozen.

The CATL factory in Debrecen is a ~EUR 7.3 billion investment. Massive water and energy demand, chemical use. Local residents and civil organizations protest in vain.

Deep poverty and hopelessness in settlements in Borsod, Szabolcs and other counties. Most EU integration funds end up with NER-connected entrepreneurs.

The government systematically drains Budapest's revenues through cutting business tax and withholding development funds. From 2020, the upper limit of business tax is reduced, primarily affecting Budapest.

Railway infrastructure is in catastrophic condition: aging rolling stock, slow signals, delays. Hungarian Post offices are closing.

Inflation crisis 2022-2024: Hungary's inflation is the EU's highest (2023: 25%+ food inflation). The forint weakens significantly. The government introduces price caps, but these are only temporary.

The Integrity Authority can investigate procurement and EU tenders but cannot bring charges. Several cases have been referred to the prosecution.

Opposition politicians and civil activists face regular intimidation: (1) Pegasus surveillance: journalists, politicians, lawyers, (2) Sovereignty Protection Office: investigations against Transparency International and Partizan.

The public works program is Hungary's largest employment scheme: ~200,000 people work below minimum wage. The program operates primarily in disadvantaged settlements. Criticism: it does not create real jobs.

K. Endre was convicted for covering up abuse at the Bicske children's home.

The first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war. Framing the sanctions policy as a failure. Defending the utility cost cuts as the most important social issue. NATO enlargement (Sweden, Finland) conditions.

Luxury real estate and art purchases. Most of the foundation assets end up with Matolcsy-connected persons. SAO investigations are fruitless.

Orban's childhood friend is Hungary's richest man.

Among the billion-forint projects of the Hungarian Architectural Museum and Monument Protection Documentation Center, Lazar's personal interests also arise.

Hungary becomes China's most important European partner. Battery factories: CATL's Debrecen plant (EUR 7.3 billion) becomes Europe's largest battery factory. BYD's Szeged plant. The planned Fudan University in Budapest.

From 2023, the government launches a mass guest worker program from Asian labor markets (Philippines, India, Indonesia, Mongolia). The program's essence: filling the labor shortage — caused by emigration and low wages.

Partizan (Marton Gulyas) is an independent YouTube channel funded by public donations that created a deep-interview format. Megafon is a state-funded political influencer network that systematically smears the opposition.

Orban: Ukraine is not suited for accession. Veto threats at EU summits. December 2023: Orban left the voting room when the start of EU accession negotiations was voted on.

The zebras symbolize the extravagant lifestyle of NER oligarchs while millions struggle with subsistence problems.

Facilities built with EU funds are often underutilized while basic infrastructure is lacking in settlements.

The closure of the Elios case, the lenient sentence in the Kaleta case, the dragging of the Simonka case are all examples of selective justice. Peter Magyar releases audio recordings.

The Recovery Fund's EUR 5.8 billion also remains frozen.

The Sovereignty Protection Office has broad powers: it can investigate foreign-funded organizations. The first targets: civil organizations, independent media. The Office head is a Fidesz-connected person.

The Sovereignty Protection Office has broad powers: it can investigate foreign-funded organizations. First targets: civil organizations, independent media.

Tourism development enriches Tiborcz's hotel empire, while Budapest sinks into a housing crisis. Lack of Airbnb regulation drives up housing prices. Tiborcz's companies (BDPST Group) receive hundreds of hotel concessions.

KSH data: 2010-2024, more than 324,000 Hungarians officially emigrated (the real number is substantially higher). In 2023, 36,000 emigrants — a new record. 7% of the active population (15-64) lives abroad.

Especially because Fidesz built its political identity on the 'child protection' slogan.

Novak pardoned the deputy director of a specialized children's home who was convicted for covering up a pedophilia case. Justice Minister Judit Varga also resigns — she countersigned the pardon.

In February 2024, it emerged that President Katalin Novak had pardoned K. Endre in April 2023 — the deputy director of the Bicske children's home, convicted for covering up the crimes of the pedophile director.

February 2024: Peter Magyar (ex-husband of Judit Varga, formerly working in NER as diplomat/businessman) appeared publicly with a video statement following the pardon scandal. He revealed the inner workings of the NER.

Within months, he becomes the strongest opposition player.

Preparing for the 2024 EU presidency. Predicts an expansion of foreign policy room. Handling the situation after President Novak's resignation. The Patriotic Europe narrative strengthening.

Peter Magyar enters the stage following the pardon scandal and his divorce, with revelations about the NER's inner workings. The TISZA Party quickly becomes the strongest opposition force. In the June 2024 EP elections, TISZA wins 7 seats.

Wasteful car procurement is characteristic of NER municipal management, where personal expenses take priority over public services.

Peter Magyar's party became the main opposition force within months.

The fine is unprecedented in EU history. Hungary does not implement the ruling but pays the fine.

The EU responds with an informal boycott of the unauthorized 'peace missions.'

The minister's wealth has been in question for years. The bag's price equals ~8 years of an average Hungarian salary.

Russian hackers broke into the Foreign Ministry's systems. Szijjarto deems not the attack but the leak as dangerous.

Fidesz gave the highway concession to NER-linked companies. Meszaros and Szijj companies receive the 35-year concession worth HUF 15-17 trillion. Contract details are classified.

Dodik is under US and EU sanctions for attempts to dismantle Bosnia. Hungary interferes in a neighboring country's internal affairs.

The government's economic policy fails: industrial production fell 6%, real wages declined, budget deficit grew to record levels. EU fund freezing worsens the situation.

The project advances despite protests from local residents, Budapest's leadership and civil organizations. The territory would be sold below market price. The case symbolizes the privatization of public goods.

Hadhazy's exposure: drone footage of swimming pools, palm house, underground garage, helicopter pad on Orban's Hatvanpuszta estate. The estate was formally Orban's father's property. Estimated cost: EUR 30 million.

The statement causes huge outrage, as Fidesz had built its legitimacy on the 1956 heritage for decades. Viktor Orban distances himself.

The step is connected to the ICC arrest warrant for Putin. Orban hosted Putin during the Hungarian presidency half-year.

The amendment is rife with gerrymandering: in Budapest constituencies, Fidesz segregates opposition voters; in swing constituencies, it integrates Fidesz voters.

The case is especially embarrassing for Fidesz, which passed the anti-LGBTQ law under the banner of 'child protection.'

Fidesz communications director aggressively confronts Peter Magyar in front of a Pecs children's home. The video goes viral. Menczer's behavior becomes a symbol of Fidesz's political style.

State media (MTVA) billion-forint budget waste throughout the year serving government propaganda.

The privatization of environmentally valuable areas continues.

Under the Fidesz government, persons close to power regularly held positions posing national security risks. Intelligence oversight is in government hands.

Hungary is the EU's largest net 'loser' member state.

US Ambassador David Pressman: Rogan is 'the primary designer, implementer and beneficiary of the corruption system.' His US assets are frozen, travel ban imposed. Szijjarto: 'petty revenge.'

The US Treasury placed Antal Rogan, the Hungarian government's propaganda chief, on the sanctions list. Reason: 'significant corruption.' Rogan is the first sitting EU member state minister on the SDN list.

The case shows the complexity of Hungarian-American relations: Orban is a Trump ally, but anti-corruption institutions continue to operate. Rogan was listed in January 2025, delisted in February, relisted in March.

Rogan is the first sanctioned EU member state minister.

The 2025 budget shows record deficit. EU fund freezing, economic slowdown and pre-election spending combine. The government chooses to loosen budget discipline.

Petition collectors are attacked in several cities. Government media continues hate incitement against Peter Magyar and TISZA.

Orban announces: full income tax exemption for mothers of 2-3 children. Trump is 'not our savior but our ally.' The three parts of the empire: Washington, Brussels, Soros depositories.

The dehumanizing rhetoric causes international outrage. Comparing opponents to bedbugs is a tool for dehumanizing political adversaries.

The law is supported by Fidesz-KDNP and Mi Hazank. International outrage; the EP and human rights organizations condemn it.

The European Court of Justice delivers ruling after ruling against Hungary. The government deems the decisions politically motivated and often does not implement them.

Hungary refuses to execute the ICC arrest warrant. The government announces: withdrawal from the ICC. International legal and diplomatic scandal.

The 13-hectare estate is formally owned by Orban's father Gyozo Orban. In reality it is Viktor Orban's residence where he receives government members and businesspeople. Fejer-B.A.L. Zrt. (Meszaros company) carried out construction.

The main message of Orban's speech: Brussels is the danger, TISZA is Brussels's puppet. Peter Magyar proclaims the end of the Gyurcsany-Orban era. Polls show an increasingly close race.

Viktor Orban is among the first to congratulate Trump's victory. Fidesz expects loosening of Russia sanctions and 'peace' policy from the Trump administration.

The economy shows no expected recovery in early 2025. Industrial production falls, investments stagnate, EU fund freezing takes effect.

The HUF 270 billion wealth loss is officially confirmed. Adam Matolcsy and friends directed the company network. Investigation for breach of fiduciary duty is underway.

Orban acknowledges: the breakthrough did not materialize. Peace economy vs. war economy framing. Fidesz as a 'self-reflective party.' On the 2026 election: 'I ask for a mandate to keep Hungary away from war.'

Fidesz prepares for the 2026 elections: TISZA Party (Peter Magyar) becomes the main challenger. Polls signal a close race. The government increases social spending.

The 2026 campaign heats up public life. The difference between the two polls reflects the political polarization of the polling market.

Viktor Orban's 2026 annual review speech focuses on war threats and economic achievements. The speech is the election campaign opener. Main messages: peace vs. war, the left serves Brussels.

On March 5, 2026, the NAV and TEK execute a pre-planned raid at the Alacska rest area on the M0 ring motorway (between the M4 and M5 junctions), stopping two armoured cash transport vehicles. The vehicles belong to the Ukrainian state-owned Oschadbank and are transporting cash and gold from the Austrian Raiffeisen Bank to Ukraine. Among the escorts is Hennadiy Kuznetsov, former Major General of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), former commander of the Alpha unit and the Anti-Terrorist Centre – whose past has been linked to corruption cases by Ukrainian investigative journalists.

The NAV opens proceedings on suspicion of money laundering. The government announces that since January 2026, approximately USD 900 million, EUR 420 million and 146 kg of gold bars have been transported through Hungary to Ukraine. Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto demands immediate answers from Kyiv, suggesting the money may be linked to the "Ukrainian war mafia".

The Garancsi connection: Telex reveals that since 2022 – since the outbreak of war – the exact same cash transports had been carried out by Criterion Cash Logistics Ltd., a company belonging to Istvan Garancsi, a personal friend of Viktor Orban (via GaranSec Zrt.). Criterion employees transported cash from Vienna to Budapest, then to Zahony on the Ukrainian border on a weekly basis, sometimes several times a week – all with the full knowledge and cooperation of the police and NAV. The company achieved HUF 21.6 billion in revenue in 2024, with the international transport division growing by 37%. The key question: if a NER-connected company had been conducting the exact same activity legally for years, why did it suddenly become suspected money laundering when Ukrainians transported with their own vehicles?

The M5 motorway lie: Government propaganda – Viktor Orban personally, Transport Minister Janos Lazar, and several pro-government media outlets – claimed the convoy was intercepted on the M5 motorway, which leads towards Serbia, not Ukraine. Lazar explicitly stated: "the M5 leads to Tisza" – deliberately linking the affair to the opposition Tisza Party. The Ukrainians' lawyer, Lorant Horvath, called this a lie: the cash transports were travelling from the M1 towards the M3 motorway with a police route permit, via the M0 ring road. They had nothing to do with the M5. Both Telex and Wikipedia confirmed the raid took place at the Alacska rest area on the M0.

Ukraine's position and legal steps: Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha calls the Hungarian action "hostage-taking" and "robbery", and turns to the EU for a legal assessment. The Oschadbank states that the transport was carried out under an interbank agreement with Raiffeisen Bank, in compliance with applicable customs regulations, as a routine foreign currency and precious metals shipment. The bank files criminal complaints at the Hungarian Central Investigation Prosecutor's Office for suspected abuse of authority and terrorism; it also submits a lawsuit to the Budapest Metropolitan Court to annul the deportation order. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry warns Ukrainian citizens not to travel to Hungary. President Zelensky calls the action "banditry".

Election campaign weapon: The operation falls during an extremely tense period – amid the shutdown of the Druzhba oil pipeline (January 27, 2026) and Hungary's blockade of a EUR 90 billion EU loan to Ukraine. Viktor Orban consults Putin by phone on March 3; Szijjarto meets Putin in Moscow in person on March 4 – one day before the raid. Fidesz immediately incorporates the convoy affair into its 2026 election campaign: faction leader Mate Kocsis initiates a fast-track legislative amendment; Parliament approves 124–28 that the NAV may conduct a 60-day special investigation and the assets remain frozen during this period. The government openly implies that some of the money may have gone to the Tisza Party – no evidence whatsoever has emerged to support this claim.

Legal concerns and disinformation: Legal analysts argue the operation did not comply with the Police Act (Rtv.) or the Criminal Procedure Act (Be.); the possibility of catching anyone in the act was conceptually excluded. The seven Ukrainian citizens were ultimately heard only as witnesses – not as suspects – since "in the case of money laundering, the movement of money itself is not the crime". Several pro-government media outlets used AI-generated, manipulated images in their coverage without disclosing their artificial origin. The Oschadbank's lawyer argues that a legal gap existed between the seizure and the creation of a legal basis for it. National security sources suggest the operation may have been the opening move of Russian electoral interference. The origin and legality of the transported assets remain unresolved as of late March 2026; meanwhile, the Ukrainian prosecutor's office has also launched an investigation against the Oschadbank's vice president.

On March 23, 2026, the pro-government Mandiner — a media outlet owned by the MCC foundation linked to Orbán's political director Balázs Orbán — publishes an audio recording made with intelligence methods, capturing investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi (Direkt36/VSquare) speaking with a source about Szijjártó's Russian contacts. The government's narrative: Panyi handed Szijjártó's phone number to a foreign intelligence service, thereby enabling the wiretapping of Hungary's foreign minister. Viktor Orbán calls it a "grave attack on Hungary" and orders an investigation. Criminal charges of espionage are filed against Panyi.

Panyi's counterstrike — the Szijjártó–Lavrov transcript: That same day, Panyi publishes the transcript of a February 2020 phone call between Péter Szijjártó and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In it, Szijjártó asks Lavrov to arrange a last-minute Moscow invitation for Slovak Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini ahead of Slovak parliamentary elections — effectively requesting Russian interference in a sovereign EU member state's elections. Panyi states that officials from seven EU member states have confirmed that Szijjártó regularly passes on confidential EU Council deliberation details to Lavrov — over open phone lines, during breaks at EU summits. Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis is among those who confirmed this practice.

International repercussions: The Washington Post had previously reported on Szijjártó's leaking, citing European security sources. Politico reports that the EU is already excluding Hungarians from sensitive negotiations over fears that classified information is being forwarded to Moscow. The European Commission requests an explanation from the Hungarian government.

Campaign context and assessment: The affair erupts at the peak of the 2026 election campaign. From the government's perspective, the offensive against Panyi serves a dual purpose: it deflects attention from the Szijjártó–Lavrov connection and the question of Russian influence, while attempting to portray the TISZA Party as a puppet of foreign intelligence services — since Panyi also discussed TISZA-linked foreign policy figure Anita Orbán on the leaked recording. However, the real scandal is not the journalist's methodological misstep, but the fact that an EU member state's foreign minister shares confidential EU information with Moscow and solicits Russian help to influence a neighboring country's elections. If the transcript's content is accurate, it raises the suspicion of political espionage — a far graver matter than a journalist sharing a phone number.

On March 25, 2026, investigative outlet Direkt36 publishes a 90-minute video interview with Bence Szabó, a police captain at the National Bureau of Investigation's (NNI) cybercrime division. Szabó provides a detailed account of how a criminal investigation was launched against two IT specialists working for the TISZA Party, based on an anonymous tip alleging child pornography — which the investigators believe was actually compiled by the Constitution Protection Office (AH), Hungary's domestic intelligence agency. The video surpasses one million views within 24 hours.

Szabó's allegations: The anonymous tip was unusually detailed (full names, addresses, usernames, technical specifications) — resembling an intelligence dossier rather than a civilian report. The AH pressured police to fast-track the raids. The investigators concluded that a "centrally directed special intelligence unit" may have been working to paralyze TISZA's IT infrastructure. The targets were not politicians but system administrators — individuals with access to the party's voter database, internal communications, and digital infrastructure. According to Szabó, the child pornography charge was a "cover story": as in the Ukrainian gold convoy case, the subjects were ultimately not treated as suspects on the original charge.

The government's counterattack: The Parliamentary National Security Committee releases a report claiming the two IT specialists had Ukrainian and Estonian intelligence connections. On March 29, the government declassifies a video from one IT worker's (H. D.) AH interrogation, in which the man acknowledges that foreign services "may have recruited" him. The government narrative: this was not an operation against TISZA but legitimate counterintelligence against Ukrainian influence, which Szabó recklessly exposed and destroyed. Interior Minister Sándor Pintér calls Szabó a "traitor," criminal proceedings are launched against him for abuse of office, and police conduct a pre-dawn raid on his home.

Unanswered questions: If this was genuinely counterintelligence, why was the child pornography cover story necessary? If the IT workers were recruited by foreign services, why were no espionage charges brought? Why did the operation coincide with the peak of the election campaign? The identity of the mysterious "Henry" — who, according to chat messages, was blackmailing the TISZA IT worker and explicitly aimed to bring down the party — was never investigated by authorities.

Societal impact: Within 48 hours, more than HUF 260 million (approx. EUR 650,000) in donations pour in for Szabó from some 28,000 individual donors — an unprecedented show of civic solidarity since Hungary's democratic transition. Over a hundred public figures voice their support. Polls indicate that even among Fidesz voters, a majority does not believe the government's official version. The affair — together with the Panyi case — becomes the defining scandal of the 2026 election campaign and further deepens the systemic crisis of trust in the independence of Hungary's intelligence services, police, and judiciary.

On March 30, 2026, 444.hu published its interview with Dániel Hrabóczki — publicly known as Gundalf — the former TISZA Party IT specialist who became the central figure in the spy scandal that erupted five days earlier. In the interview, Hrabóczki gave a detailed account of how he deliberately misled the staff of the Constitution Protection Office (AH) during his interrogation.

The disinformation: Hrabóczki stated that he intentionally made numerous false claims during his AH interrogation. After receiving a warning from an unknown individual using the name "Theo" — who allegedly had inside knowledge of AH operations — that the office was interfering in proceedings against him, he decided to "take control" and construct the narrative he would present to his interrogators. His goal was to be able to refute the recording's contents retroactively if the government made it public — which is exactly what happened.

The polygraph: Hrabóczki was also subjected to a lie detector test at the AH, which — by his own account — he passed. The polygraph questions included whether he had contact with foreign intelligence services, whether he participated in cyberattacks, and whether he had visited the Estonian embassy — he answered no to all. AH staff informed him at a second meeting that the polygraph showed "99 percent certainty." Hrabóczki posed the question: if the government released the interrogation video, why did it not release the polygraph results?

Context and significance: The interview reframed the entire spy scandal. The government had declassified the video of Hrabóczki's AH interrogation on March 29 and presented it as "decisive evidence" of "Ukrainian espionage." Hrabóczki, however, claims that most of what was said in the recording was deliberate disinformation — including his statements about the Cyber Defence Centre. This called into question the government propaganda machine's key "evidence."

A 19-year-old versus the intelligence services: The affair's particular irony is that the government's entire intelligence apparatus — the Constitution Protection Office, its interrogators, and the polygraph — was outsmarted by a teenager. According to Hrabóczki, he had been working on harmless projects with peers in Tallinn and Kyiv (including running a shared Minecraft server); the "Ukrainian training" suggested by government propaganda amounted to five days in Kyiv, two of which were spent travelling. The interview surpassed one million views within 16 hours.