The National Cooperation Program — 16 Years in Review
On March 12, 2010, Fidesz-KDNP published its election program known as the "Policy of National Affairs." Below, we compare the program's 30 most important, specific promises with what actually happened during 16 years of governance. The assessment is based on publicly available sources — KSH, Eurostat, OECD, investigative newsrooms.
Responsible: Matolcsy György
The number of employed persons was 3.87 million in 2010 and 4.70 million in 2024 — a growth of ~830,000, not one million. The 10-year deadline (2020) was not met, and COVID disrupted the process. The figure includes public works participants (peak ~200,000), workers abroad (~110,000), which the original promise did not count. Actual growth in the primary labor market was ~640,000–700,000. The employment rate improvement is positive even in an EU context, but the program text referred to jobs created by "businesses operating in Hungary."
The introduction of the 16%, then 15% flat income tax did simplify the tax system, and taxes on labor decreased. However, VAT rose to 27% (EU record), numerous special taxes were created (bank tax, transaction levy, advertising tax, windfall tax, etc.), and KATA was drastically restricted in 2022. Through consumption taxes, the tax burden shifted to the population. The tax system overall did not become simpler — the special tax regime is unpredictable.
Bureaucracy did not decrease noticeably. New reporting obligations, online data systems (NAV Online Invoice), EKAER, constantly changing regulations, and special tax administration all increased the burden. On the World Bank Doing Business index, Hungary ranked 47th in 2010 and 52nd in 2020. Business environment predictability worsened due to ad hoc legislation.
The share of domestic companies in public procurement did increase. But the system was optimized for entrepreneurs linked to the NER. Lorinc Meszaros, previously Lajos Simicska, and other government-linked oligarchs became the main winners. Procurement transparency worsened further; the share of single-bidder tenders rose to among the highest in the EU. OLAF and the European Commission regularly criticized Hungarian procurement practice. The program text specifically condemned corruption — which became worse than ever.
GMO-free status was maintained (also enshrined in the Fundamental Law). However, the land program served government-linked large landowners instead of small and medium-sized farmers. At the 2013 and 2015 land auctions, NER-linked actors acquired the land. The share of small farms continued to decline. Janos Lazar's estate, for example, grew to several thousand hectares.
The export-side success of the Eastern opening was minimal — the EU remained the dominant trade partner (75%+). Import-side result: Asian (mainly Chinese and Korean) factory investments (Samsung, CATL, BYD). But these were attracted with massive state subsidies, environmental concerns arose, and the battery industry's market outlook deteriorated. "Keeping the advantages gained in the EU" failed: frozen EU funds, rule of law proceedings.
Vocational training was fully restructured: new law, strengthening of dual elements, creation of technical schools. The early school-leaver rate decreased. Most experts supported the direction of the reform, though many criticized implementation details (e.g. the professional focus came at the expense of general knowledge). Overall, the commitment was essentially fulfilled.
Responsible: Lázár János
Accountability commissioner Gyula Budai departed in 2012 without substantive results. Not a single former government member went to prison. The "investigation phase" was concluded, but the "reckoning phase" never came. Meanwhile, Fidesz-era corruption cases (Elios, Istvan Tiborcz, Lorinc Meszaros, MNB foundations) far exceed those of the 2002–2010 period.
Political privileges did not decrease but became systemic. The pardon affair (Novak–K. Endre scandal), the Gabor Kaleta pedophile case with a lenient sentence, Pal Volner's bribery case, regular use of parliamentary immunity to avoid prosecution. The prosecution systematically fails to bring charges against government-linked persons. The EU rule of law mechanism specifically criticizes the lack of independent anti-corruption action.
Police numbers increased somewhat, the vehicle fleet improved. Salaries rose, but the police shortage remained a persistent problem — thousands of positions are unfilled. Police pay development lagged behind other sectors. The result is mixed: there are more police, but regarding the promise of a "serving, not ruling police," there was regression (e.g. border hunter recruitment, using law enforcement for political purposes).
The "three strikes" rule was introduced in the 2012 new Criminal Code (mandatory actual life imprisonment for violent repeat offenders). Criminal laws were generally tightened. The prison population grew. The promise was formally fulfilled, though experts debate its effectiveness.
Rural hospitals, schools and post offices were closed. The doctor shortage is worse than in 2010. Local medical care ceased in many settlements, public transport deteriorated. Fidesz did to rural areas exactly what it blamed the Socialists for in its program: the state "abolished itself" in numerous small settlements.
Complex civil and commercial proceedings can still drag on for years. In EU comparison, the system does not perform outstandingly. Judicial independence was attacked politically on multiple occasions (administrative courts affair, Tunde Hando's National Judicial Office presidency). The narrowing of the Curia's jurisdiction and the weakening of judicial self-governance all point in the opposite direction to the program's spirit.
Responsible: Pesti Imre
According to the 2025 OECD report, Hungary spends 6.5% of GDP on healthcare, compared to the EU average of 9.3%. The gap did not shrink over 16 years but widened. There is no health minister — since 2022, the sector falls under the Interior Ministry at state secretary level. Healthcare is the only major policy area that has never received its own minister during the Fidesz era.
Waiting lists did not decrease but grew. At the end of 2024, 32,000 people were waiting for surgery; by December 2025, it was 38,000. The system's deterioration was documented in detail by a Direkt36 article series. Hospital debt has remained a cyclically recurring problem.
In 2021, informal payments were banned, in parallel with significant doctor pay raises. The fulfillment is real and substantive — this is the most successful point in the healthcare sector. Implementation was delayed by 11 years but was ultimately achieved.
The pay raises slowed but did not stop emigration. The shortage of healthcare workers remained catastrophic — nurse shortage, caregiver shortage. The aging of the general practitioner system continued. More than 300 GP practices remain unfilled. Emergency care in rural areas has collapsed in many places.
Hospital privatization did not occur; in fact, in 2012, municipal hospitals were also nationalized. The promise was fulfilled — though centralization created different problems (vulnerability of hospital directors, political appointments).
Responsible: Soltész Miklós
The family support system expanded (CSOK, Baby Loan, increased family tax credit, income tax exemption for mothers of four). But: the birth rate in 2025 was the lowest since 1949. The population fell below 9.5 million. The programs primarily benefited the middle and upper-middle class — for the poorest, conditional support was hard to access.
The 13th month pension was restored (gradually from 2021), with inflation-tracking increases. But: the 2022-23 hyperinflation (25%+) was compensated only belatedly, and the real value of pensions temporarily decreased significantly. The promise that private pension funds "will not be endangered" was a complete failure: in 2010-11, private fund savings were effectively nationalized.
In 2010-2011, the government effectively nationalized the ~3 trillion HUF in private fund assets. Those who did not return to the state system lost the employer contribution. This was the most dramatic violation of the promise — they acted in diametric opposition to the pledge.
Segregation increased, not decreased. The CJEU condemned Hungary in 2020 for school segregation. The Roma scholarship system was not meaningfully expanded. The public works program remained a dead end for integration. Territorial segregation and ghettoization continued.
In 2025, Viktor Orban himself acknowledged that the social sector did not receive pay raises. After 15 years of governance, social workers' pay remains among the lowest in the public sector. Mass emigration from the sector is underway.
Daily physical education was gradually introduced from 2012. The promise was fulfilled, although the infrastructure (lack of gymnasiums) was not prepared for it in many places.
Responsible: Navracsics Tibor
The two-thirds majority was used for the systematic dismantling of democratic checks and balances. The narrowing of the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, the partisan takeover of the Media Council and media authority, political control of the prosecution, the truncation of the Fiscal Council, and tailoring the electoral system to party interests all point in the opposite direction to the promise. The EU launched rule of law proceedings (Article 7). Freedom House: Hungary received a "partly free" classification.
The concealment of public interest data became systemic. The 30-year classification of the Paks II contract, the classification of the Budapest–Belgrade railway, the withholding of COVID data, and the opacity of TAO spending are all contrary to the promise. Antal Rogan had government data classified citing national security grounds.
Hungary's international reputation deteriorated dramatically. EU rule of law proceedings, frozen EU funds (~30 billion euros), isolation due to the veto system, the sole "soft line" within the EU on the Russia-Ukraine war, Hungarian officials on the US sanctions list (Antal Rogan). The European Parliament voted to classify Hungary as a hybrid regime. Reliability within NATO decreased.
The number of MPs was reduced from 386 to 199 — this was fulfilled. However, the municipal system did not become more effective: central withdrawals increased, the solidarity contribution imposes severe burdens, municipal dependence on the government is at unprecedented levels. Politically-based resource allocation is systemic.
Fidesz rhetoric continuously shifted toward the far right: anti-migrant rhetoric, "anti-gender" campaigns, the anti-"LGBTQ propaganda" law, the Soros campaign. Mi Hazank became a parliamentary force in 2022. Instead of "eliminating" extremism, Fidesz adopted and mainstreamed its rhetoric.
Reading this promise in 2026 has an almost satirical effect. The state became a servant of NER oligarchs, legislation regularly serves individual business interests (lex Meszaros, lex Tiborcz type laws). The 2010 Fidesz program literally describes the very condition that they themselves created over 16 years.
The National Cooperation Program in 2010 was a sweeping, ambitious document that, while excoriating the previous eight years of governance, promised radical change. 16 years later, the result is extremely mixed:
What was actually fulfilled (5 promises, 16.7%): the smaller parliament, the "three strikes" law, the elimination of informal payments, keeping hospitals in public ownership, and daily physical education. These are concrete, measurable and implemented measures.
What was partially fulfilled (8 promises, 26.7%): employment expansion by nearly one million (but not entirely as promised), tax system simplification (but with drastic increases in consumption taxes), expansion of family support (but birth numbers still at historic lows), pension indexation (but with nationalization of private funds).
Where the opposite happened (7 promises, 23.3%): public procurement transparency, equality before the law, the democratic institutional system, public access to data of public interest, the country's international reputation, protecting private pension funds, and ensuring the impartiality of the state. These are the program's most dramatic failures — where the government not only did not deliver, but actively moved in the opposite direction.
What was not fulfilled (10 promises, 33.3%): accountability, reducing bureaucracy, increasing healthcare spending, reducing waiting lists, stopping doctor emigration, Roma integration, appreciation of social workers, fast court proceedings, eliminating extremism, and ensuring the impartiality of the state.
The deepest contradiction lies in the program text itself. The 2010 Fidesz program literally describes the very problems — corruption, concentration of power, serving private interests, hollowing out democracy — that its own 16 years of governance created, according to international organizations, investigative newsrooms and independent analysts. Chapter 5 of the program (democratic norms) is almost a mirror image of what the European Parliament, Freedom House and the Venice Commission currently find about Hungary — only not as a result of Socialist but of Fidesz governance.