Law changes, gerrymandering, Kubatov list — How did Fidesz entrench itself?
In 2011, the Fidesz-KDNP two-thirds majority completely transformed the Hungarian electoral system. The new rules, the redrawing of electoral district boundaries, and informal voter data collection together created a structure where a two-thirds parliamentary majority can be achieved with 54% of the votes. This page presents the changes, their impact, and places the Hungarian system in international context.
Act CCIII of 2011 on the election of members of parliament
386 representatives, two-round voting in 176 districts, regional and national compensation lists. The system was relatively balanced: the compensation lists mitigated distortions from individual districts, and the two-round system allowed for tactical voting.
199 representatives, single-round voting in 106 districts, a single national list with 93 mandates. Regional lists were eliminated, the two-round system was abolished.
| Characteristic | Old (1990-2010) | Új (2012–) |
|---|---|---|
| Number of representatives | 386 | 199 |
| Individual districtek | 176 (two-round) | 106 (single-round) |
| List mandateok | 210 (regional + national) | 93 (national only) |
| Compensation | Regional + national lists | National list only |
| Winner compensation | None | Yes (surplus vote bonus) |
| Threshold | 5% | 5% (coalition: 10-15%) |
| Rounds | Two rounds | One round |
The 2011 law introduced the so-called "winner compensation," a mechanism that is unique worldwide. In traditional compensation systems, only the "remainder votes" of losing candidates are included in list distribution to reduce distortion. However, in the new Hungarian system, the surplus votes cast for the winning candidate also enter the list compensation — that is, the vote difference between the winner and the runner-up (minus one) is also added to the winning party's list votes.
This mechanism reverses the original purpose of compensation: rather than helping smaller parties, it rewards the strongest party. If a party dominantly wins in individual districts, in addition to individual mandates it also receives extra list mandates. According to Partizán and several political scientists, Fidesz-KDNP would not have achieved a two-thirds majority in 2014 and 2018 without this mechanism.
In 2014, six mandates, and in 2018, five mandates depended exclusively on winner compensation — in both cases, that was exactly what was needed for a two-thirds majority. Therefore, without winner compensation, Fidesz would not have had a constitutional amendment majority even once after 2010.
While a single party has a 5% parliamentary threshold, a coalition of two parties must reach 10%, and a coalition of three or more parties must reach 15%. This rule clearly works against opposition coalitions: if multiple smaller parties try to cooperate, they must achieve a higher vote share than if they ran separately and potentially entered independently.
In practice, this forces opposition parties to either run on a common list (which leads to internal conflicts) or run separately (which leads to vote splitting) — both scenarios favor Fidesz.
"They surround the city" — Magyar Narancs
Gerrymandering: the intentional, politically motivated redrawing of electoral district boundaries to provide one party with a systemic advantage. It has two main methods:
Packing: The opponent's voters are concentrated into as few districts as possible so that although they win by large margins there, they gain fewer mandates overall.
Cracking: The opponent's voters are spread across multiple districts so they don't achieve a majority anywhere.
In 2011, with its two-thirds majority, Fidesz determined not only the electoral law but also the precise boundaries of the 106 new individual electoral districts. District boundaries were incorporated into the Fundamental Law's appendix, so a two-thirds majority is required to change them — meaning the opposition alone can never change them.
2014 electoral data showed significant correlation between Fidesz popularity and individual constituency sizes. Fidesz-favorable constituencies were typically smaller (under 70,000 voters), while opposition-dominated constituencies were larger (over 80,000 voters). This means that a Fidesz mandate was "cheaper" in terms of votes compared to an opposition mandate. Fidesz votes were worth 3-4% more purely due to district inequality.
Based on the 2024 European Parliament election results, gerrymandering patterns can be identified: districts 5 and 6 concentrate already Tisza-majority voters (packing), while districts 2, 7, 10, 12, and 13 mix Fidesz and opposition areas (cracking).
District boundaries are part of the Fundamental Law, so a two-thirds parliamentary majority is required to change them. Since the electoral system was calibrated precisely to allow Fidesz to maintain its two-thirds majority, this created a self-reinforcing cycle: the distorted system ensures the two-thirds majority, and the two-thirds majority protects the distorted system.
This means that even if the opposition gains a simple majority, it cannot redraw district boundaries — unless it gains a two-thirds majority, which is disproportionately harder due to the system's distortions.
A system named after Gábor Kubatov, Fidesz vice-president and campaign chief
The Kubatov List is a voter database built by Fidesz in the 2000s. The system works by having Fidesz activists go door-to-door, make phone calls, and use other campaign tools to record not only voters' contact information but also their political sympathies: who supports Fidesz, who is opposition, who is undecided, and how mobilizable they are.
In Hungary, there is a legal prohibition on registering voters on political grounds without their consent. The National Election Authority (OVB) found that Fidesz violated voter data collection rules and initiated proceedings.
In 2010, an audio recording leaked in which Gábor Kubatov detailed the party's mobilization system. In 2019, a Fidesz representative accidentally posted a photo showing the Kubatov List — voters were categorized as "Supporter," "Opponent," and "Undecided." In 2019-2020, such lists were photographed in Kaposvár, Érd, and the Eger mayor's office.
In November 2025, Gergely Gulyás, minister leading the Prime Minister's Office, simply denied the existence of the Kubatov List during a government press conference — despite numerous photos, audio recordings, and press materials documenting its operation. The address of the online system running on servers registered in America was also made public.
Same citizenship, entirely different voting conditions
Since 2011, cross-border Hungarian citizens (primarily living in Transylvania, Upper Hungary, Vojvodina, and Transcarpathia) can vote by mail — simply, from home. Meanwhile, citizens with a Hungarian address who work in the EU or other Western countries can only vote in person at the nearest embassy or consulate — sometimes requiring travel of several hundred kilometres. This distinction is not accidental: 90–97% of cross-border voters vote for Fidesz, while the majority of the Western diaspora votes for the opposition.
Since the 2010 simplified naturalisation law, more than 1.1 million cross-border Hungarians have received dual citizenship. Since 2014, they can vote by mail: after registration, they receive and return their ballot by post. They can only vote for the party list (not individual candidates), but voting is done from home with minimal effort.
Hungarian citizens who have a Hungarian address but live or work abroad (e.g., in the EU, the United Kingdom, or the USA) cannot vote by mail. They must appear in person at the nearest Hungarian diplomatic mission (embassy, consulate). They can vote for both individual candidates and the party list — but the requirement of physical presence deters many.
| Criterion | Cross-border (no address) | Living abroad (with address) |
|---|---|---|
| Voting method | By mail, from home | In person, at embassy |
| Travel required? | No | Yes, up to 300+ km |
| Can vote for… | Party list only | Individual + party list |
| Typical vote | 90–97% Fidesz | Majority opposition |
| Registration validity | Valid for 10 years | Must re-register each election |
Embassy voting poses serious logistical barriers. A few examples:
Germany: There are five polling stations, but none in the central part of the country (around Bremen, Hanover, Hamburg) — the nearest is 300 km away.
United Kingdom: From Newcastle, the nearest polling station is Edinburgh, 200 km away. From Wales, one must travel to London, 300+ km.
Generally: Voting takes place during working hours, requiring a full day of round-trip travel, waiting, and a day off work. For voters with families, shift workers, or those facing financial difficulties, this is effectively prohibitive.
The government has never extended the option of mail voting to citizens with a Hungarian address who are abroad. According to Political Capital and other analysts, this is a deliberate decision: the Western diaspora consists largely of opposition voters, while the overwhelming majority of cross-border voters support Fidesz. Extending mail voting to the entire diaspora would be disadvantageous for Fidesz.
| Election | Registered mail voters | Valid votes | Fidesz share | Extra seats for Fidesz |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | ~193,000 | ~128,000 | ~95% | +1 seat |
| 2018 | ~378,000 | ~225,000 | ~97% | 0 (but strengthened the list) |
| 2022 | ~456,000 | ~264,000 | ~94% | +2 seats |
In 2022, Fidesz–KDNP received nearly 248,000 mail votes, resulting in two extra list seats. While this may not seem like much on its own, it can be decisive in a close election — especially considering that the two-thirds majority has depended on just a few seats in previous elections.
The collection of mail ballots is frequently organised and coordinated by party activists, particularly in cross-border territories. Both the OSCE and Human Rights Watch have noted that the journey of mail ballots from voter to the National Election Office is insufficiently monitored: ballots frequently reach their destination through party intermediaries, calling into question the principles of secrecy and integrity.
How Much Is a Vote Worth in the Hungarian System?
We expect a democratic electoral system to have mandate shares roughly reflect vote shares. In the Hungarian system, Fidesz achieved a two-thirds majority in 2014, 2018, and 2022 — without two-thirds of voters voting for them.
| Election | Fidesz vote share | Fidesz mandate share | Deviation | Two-thirds? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 44,9% | 66,8% (133/199) | +21,9% | Yes |
| 2018 | 49,3% | 66,8% (133/199) | +17,5% | Yes |
| 2022 | 54,1% | 67,8% (135/199) | +13,7% | Yes |
In 2014, Fidesz-KDNP achieved a two-thirds majority with less than 45% of the votes. In a fully proportional system, this would have meant about 89 mandates out of 199, not 133.
In 2022, in individual districts, Fidesz-KDNP received barely half the votes but won more than 90% of individual mandates. The opposition could convert its votes into mandates mainly through list voting. This "winner-takes-all" effect is a natural characteristic of the single-round, individual district system — which gerrymandering further amplifies.
Comparison of three European systems
Type: Mixed, with majoritarian excess
Mandates: 199 (106 individual + 93 list)
Special feature: Winner compensation, single-round, gerrymandered districts
Index of disproportionality: ~13-22% deviation between vote share and mandate share
Type: Mixed, with proportional compensation (MMP)
Mandates: ~736 (variable: overhang + equalizing)
Special feature: Equalizing mandates ensure proportionality
Index of disproportionality: ~3-5% deviation
Type: Purely proportional (national list)
Mandates: 150
Special feature: Single national district, no gerrymandering possible
Index of disproportionality: ~1.2% deviation
A holland rendszer Európa legarányosabb rendszere: a szavazatok szinte tökéletesen tükröződnek a mandátumokban. A német vegyes rendszer (MMP) kiegyenlítő mandátumokkal biztosítja, hogy a listás szavazatok korrigálják az egyéni körzetek torzítását. A magyar rendszer formálisan szintén „vegyes", de valójában a többségi elem dominál, és a kompenzáció a győztest jutalmazza — pontosan az ellentéte annak, amire a kompenzáció más országokban szolgál.
| Szempont | 🇭🇺 Magyarország | 🇩🇪 Németország | 🇳🇱 Hollandia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two-thirds achievable... | ~54% votestal | ~60%+ szavazattal | ~67% szavazattal |
| Purpose of Compensation | Rewards the winner | Ensures proportionality | Not necessary (proportional) |
| Gerrymandering risk | High (constitutionally entrenched) | Moderate (independent commission) | None (national list) |
| OSCE assessment | "Unequal Conditions" | Meets standards | Meets standards |
OSCE, Freedom House, Electoral Integrity Project
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) found that while the legal framework was fundamentally suitable for democratic elections, several key aspects fell short of international standards. The election "was competitive, but the overlap between state and governing party communication, media bias, and non-transparent campaign financing distorted the competition".
In Freedom House's 2025 report, Hungary maintained its "partly free" rating. Regarding the electoral process, the organization highlighted the one-sided media environment, the lack of transparency in campaign financing, and the structural distortion of the electoral system.
The German Marshall Fund's 2026 analysis emphasized that robust international observation is essential for the 2026 elections to ensure electoral credibility.
Milestones in Electoral System Transformation
How would mandate distribution change with different vote shares?
Several independent Hungarian developers have created calculators to compute how many mandates each party would win at different vote shares. This brilliantly demonstrates the system's distortion — try it out to see how many votes the opposition needs for a two-thirds majority versus Fidesz!
Mandate Calculator 2026 — valasztas2026.com
valasztasirendszer.hu — Calculator v2.0
21 Research Centre — Mandate Calculator
The 2011 electoral law was not a simple technical reform — it was a systemic overhaul designed in every aspect to preserve Fidesz-KDNP's hold on power. Reducing the number of representatives, implementing a single-round system, introducing winner compensation, raising the coalition threshold, and creating gerrymandered districts together create a structure where 45-54% of votes is enough for a two-thirds, constitution-amending majority.
In other European democracies — Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia — electoral systems aim for proportionality: mandate distribution reflects vote share as well as possible. In Hungary, the system works exactly the opposite way: it rewards the winner and structurally disadvantages the opposition.
The Kubatov List further distorts the picture, facilitating targeted mobilization through illegal voter registration. The OSCE, Freedom House, and the Electoral Integrity Project have all concluded that Hungarian elections are "free but not fair" — unequal competition conditions are a built-in feature of the system, not an accidental side effect.
This system is not like this by accident. It was deliberately designed to disproportionately reward the largest party, and it was constitutionally entrenched so that the opposition — even with a majority mandate — cannot change it.